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Abstract
This article focuses on the post-colonial catch-up by Southeast Asian nations with 
developed countries. The article offers an analysis of the nature and causes of the 
middle income trap in Southeast Asia. It discusses various interpretations of this 
concept, concluding with the dichotomy between laissez-faire and interventionist 
development strategies.  Empirical evidence is provided from the automotive 
industry in Malaysia and Thailand. Two rival explanations of the lack of strong 
interventionist policies in Southeast Asia are given, one stressing the weakness 
of political pressure on national governments, the other linked up with historical 
patterns of ethnic specialization and division. The argument draws on secondary 
sources and reflects on implications for the study of Indonesian economic history 
in the colonial era.
Abstrak
Artikel in focus pada usaha mengejar ketertinggalan pembangunan negara-negara 
Asia Tenggara dengan negara-negara maju pada masa pasca-kolonial. Artikel 
ini menyajikan analisis sifat dan alasan terjadinya perangkap menengah (middle 
income trap) di Asia Tenggara. Ia membahas beragam pemahaman dari konsep ini, 
dan ditutup dengan pembahasan strategi dikotomis antara laissez-faire dengan 
pembangunan negara (interventionist development). Bukti-bukti empiris disajikan 
dari industri otomotif di Malaysia dan Thailand. Dua penjelasan mengenai lemahnya 
kebijakan intervensi di Asia Tenggara dikemukakan; yang satu menekankan 
lemahnya tekanan politik terhadap pemerintahan nasional dan yang lainnya 
menghubungkannya dengan pola spesialisasi dan divisi etnis yang lama berlangsung 
dalam sejarah. Argument-argumen ini menggunakan sumber-sumber sekunder dan 
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Introduction
‘It is better to regard foreign capital as a necessary evil, and the sooner 
a country gets rid of it, the better, since the country can enjoy more 
economic benefits. For example, Japan made little use of foreign capital 
(meaning direct investment).’
(Yoshihara Kunio, The rise of ersatz capitalism in South-East Asia, 1988: 
123).
In the last decades of the twentieth century, Southeast Asia became a 
byword for development success and an acknowledged part of the ‘East Asian 
Miracle’ (World Bank, 1993). From the 1960s onward, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and (later) Vietnam all achieved rates of both aggregate growth 
and poverty reduction which were among the highest in human history. The 
spectacular gains of this period were won mainly by two complementary 
means. The first was an agricultural revolution, based on irrigation, seed-
fertilizer technologies, and rural infrastructure, which improved the 
productivity and profitability of tens of millions of small farms. The second 
was a boom in labor-intensive, export-oriented industrial production, 
often funded by foreign investment, which provided jobs for millions of 
low-skilled workers. Besides the direct beneficiaries of these two engines of 
inclusive growth, millions more found employment in the - mostly informal 
- service sector that boomed as an indirect result of agricultural and industrial 
expansion. The role of the developmental state in this period was to provide 
conditions of economic freedom, to organize the large but technically 
straightforward public investments needed for smallholder agricultural 
development, and to supply the macroeconomic stability and outward-
oriented trade policies needed to stimulate private industrial investment 
(Henley, 2015).
By the turn of the century, however, the low-hanging fruit that could 
be plucked by these means was nearing exhaustion. Rising wages and growing 
competition from poorer countries limited the scope for further labor-
intensive industrial growth, while diminishing returns and an increasingly 
urban population reduced the impact and utility of further agricultural 
development. Only two countries in the region - the tiny oil sultanate 
of Brunei and the city-state and international seaport of Singapore, both 
exceptional cases by any standards - had meanwhile succeeded in raising the 
incomes of their citizens to developed country levels. For the rest of Southeast 
Asia, despite all that had been achieved in absolute terms, the goal of following 
Taiwan and South Korea into the ranks of the world’s rich nations remained 
a remote dream. Between 1960 and 2010 the third richest country in the 
region, Malaysia, increased its per capita GDP from about 10 percent of that 
of the USA to about 20 percent, and the fourth richest, Thailand, from four 
percent to ten percent (Hill, 2014: 5). At this rate, actually catching up with 
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the developed countries might take centuries. Small wonder that policy-
makers talk increasingly of a ‘middle-income trap’, and that economists are 
inclined to demote Southeast Asia’s development record to the status of ‘half-
way miracle’ (Booth, 2016).
In this article I outline an - inevitably simplified and incomplete - 
argument about the nature and causes of the middle income trap in Southeast 
Asia. The argument is based entirely on secondary sources and owes particular 
debts to the ever-inspiring work of Yoshihara Kunio, and to Joe Studwell’s 
lucid, gritty accounts of Asian business life and lives. Nevertheless I believe 
that the synthesis as a whole has not been presented before in this form. The 
article is structured as follows. The first section following this introduction 
sketches competing interpretations of the trap and suggests that the 
economically ‘heterodox view, which contrasts the laissez-faire development 
strategies of contemporary Southeast Asia with South Korea’s history of 
active, interventionist, and successful industrial policy, provides a promising 
starting point. The next section summarizes, with particular reference to 
the automotive industry in Malaysia and Thailand, empirical evidence that 
without such intervention, manufacturing enterprises in developing countries 
tend to become enmeshed in ultimately debilitating dependency relationships 
with foreign capital. The two subsequent  sections deal respectively with two 
useful types of explanation for the absence or ineffectiveness of interventionist 
industrial policy in Southeast Asia, one emphasizing the relative weakness 
of the political and existential pressures on Southeast Asian governments to 
succeed in making their countries industrial powers, the other highlighting 
the adverse political and ideological consequences of Southeast Asia’s long-
standing pattern of ethnic commercial specialization and internal societal 
division. A concluding section recapitulates the argument and reflects on its 
implications for the study of Indonesian economic history during the colonial 
era.
The Middle-Income Trap: Diagnoses and Prescriptions
Prescriptions for escaping the middle-income trap, as we shall see, vary 
dramatically. However there is agreement across the ideological spectrum 
that a large part of the challenge has to do with mastery of technology and 
innovation (Gill & Kharas, 2015; Wade, 2016). Whereas firms in middle-
income countries use and sometimes copy imported technology and ideas, 
high-income countries are home to enterprises which create and own new 
technology and ideas, and which have much power to determine who, if 
anybody, gets to share them, and at what price. Although famous Northeast 
Asian industrial companies like Samsung and Sony take advantage of 
Southeast Asia’s low labor costs to manufacture extensively there for the 
global market, Southeast Asia has no such global manufacturing brands of its 
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own. Incubating innovative, market-leading, wealth-creating firms, analysts 
agree, is much more difficult than attracting them to one’s shores.
Innovative firms are not built overnight. The examples of Hyundai, 
Samsung, Sony, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, and now 
China International Marine Containers, Infosys, Lenovo, Wipro, and others 
show how lengthy and resource intensive the process can be. No Malaysian 
firm - or for that matter no firm in Indonesia, the Philippines, or Thailand 
- has as yet embarked on the path to achieving competitiveness that is based 
on innovation (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2009: 216.)
As a consequence of their lack of indigenous technological capacity, 
the economies of the middle-income Southeast Asian countries ‘tend to be 
dualistic, with foreign firms dominating high-tech exports as assemblers, 
exhibiting few linkages to domestic producers of intermediate and capital 
goods’ (Doner, 2009: 9). Domestic capital and enterprise, meanwhile, 
concentrates on property, services, protected national consumer markets, 
and extractive industries, where competitive pressures and technological 
demands are lower.
Where diagnoses of the middle-income trap part company is on 
the question of what governments can and should do in order to remedy 
this situation. What might be called the orthodox school of thought calls 
for provision of more and better education; for improvement of the 
entrepreneurial environment through deregulation and strengthening of 
the rule of law, including intellectual property rights; and (sometimes) for 
state support for industrial research and development (Kharas & Kohli, 2011; 
Tran, 2013). These prescriptions, however, are arguably based more on a 
particular interpretation of Western historical experience than on empirical 
observation of the processes at work in the contemporary developing world. 
As a glance at the Philippines, at one time by far the most educated country 
in Southeast Asia, readily suggests, the causal relationship between education 
and development performance is actually a weak one at best (Chang, 2011). 
Among developing countries, correlations between economic growth and 
conventional ‘good governance’ indicators such as legal security are also 
surprisingly weak (Khan, 2007). In the late twentieth century, corruption 
in business and politics was no less a feature of rapidly industrializing South 
Korea than it was of the economically stagnant Philippines (Kang, 2002).
The alternative or heterodox view is that active, interventionist 
industrial policies are necessary to create an innovative and internationally 
competitive manufacturing sector (Studwell, 2013; Wade, 2008). This 
argument takes its cue from the experiences of the only two (large) 
countries which can unreservedly be said to have made the transition from 
underdeveloped to developed status since the mid-twentieth century, Taiwan 
and (especially) South Korea (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). Both of these 
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countries followed (broadly speaking) capitalist development paths, and both 
owed their initial success partly to infrastructure-based, smallholder-friendly 
agricultural and rural development policies comparable to those pursued in 
Southeast Asia. Their industrial strategies, however, differed markedly from 
those of Southeast Asia. Instead of relying on free markets, their governments 
restricted foreign investment while actively directing domestic investment 
into industries and activities judged to have developmental utility. Policy 
instruments here included domestic market protection, selective subsidies, 
and credit from state-owned commercial banks. Access to these benefits, 
however, was made strictly conditional on rapid success in export markets, 
and firms which did not meet export targets were allowed to fail.
Debate over the causes of the Northeast/Southeast Asia development 
divergence continues, and the industrial policy explanation is doubtless not 
the whole story (Lin & Chang, 2009; Chu, 2016). The interventionist model 
fits South Korea more completely than it fits Taiwan, where heavy industry 
and large corporations were less specifically targeted by development planners 
than in the Korean case (Dollar & Sokoloff, 1994). Comparisons between 
South Korean and Southeast Asian experiences nevertheless seem to validate 
some of the points made in heterodox interpretations of the Korean success 
story. In particular, such comparisons suggest that post-war Korean political 
leaders were right to suspect that a strong foreign manufacturing presence in 
the country would not ultimately benefit Korean industry. In what follows this 
point is illustrated with particular reference to the comparative development 
of the automobile industry, by most accounts a key element of the Northeast 
Asian (or at least, Korean and Japanese) success stories, in South Korea and 
in Southeast Asia.
Dependent Versus Independent Industrial Development
Three decades ago, at the height of Southeast Asia’s economic progress and 
poverty reduction, Yoshihara Kunio warned in a provocative book entitled 
The rise of ersatz capitalism in South-East Asia that when it came to the big 
business sector, all was not as promising as it seemed in the ‘miracle’ economies 
of the region. Borrowing his terminology partly from critical literature on 
the political economy of Latin America, Yoshihara argued that although the 
Southeast Asian economies were no longer dominated by foreign capital, 
and although domestic capitalists were active in manufacturing as well as 
agriculture, construction and services, manufacturing companies remained 
entirely dependent on foreign firms for their technology. Yoshihara wrote:
‘Southeast Asian industrial capital cannot act as the vanguard of 
economic development because it does not have export capability. [...] This 
is because large industrial capitalists are comprador capitalists (acting as the 
agents of foreign manufacturers in their own countries), or they depend on 
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foreign technology in a broader sense, or they are not efficient enough to 
compete in the international market.’ (Yoshihara, 1988: 3)
Nowhere was the comprador or ‘ersatz’ character of Southeast Asian 
capitalism clearer, according to Yoshihara, than in the motor vehicle industry. 
In this developmentally important sector, the relationship between local 
manufacturers and their foreign ‘partners’ was such that they were structurally 
prevented from acquiring any skills and technologies which might enable 
them to develop their own export capacity. The result was a permanent 
and debilitating pattern of dependent development and ‘technologyless 
industrialization’.
‘South-East Asian capitalists [...] are engaged in motor vehicle and motor 
vehicle parts production. Their activities appear quite technologically 
sophisticated, and they are sometimes hailed as industrial pioneers; but 
the fact is that they are Japanese compradors. [...] Most of the major 
components are supplied by Japanese companies, and some which 
are produced locally are made under the technical supervision of the 
Japanese companies. Technologically [...] they are almost 100 per cent 
dependent on their Japanese licensers, and, under the present set-up, it 
would be impossible for them to become technologically independent 
and start exporting their products. Their technological dependency 
is not temporary but, being structural, semi-permanent.’ (Yoshihara, 
1988, 111-112)
The rise of ersatz capitalism was quite sceptically received at the time, with 
critics questioning the ‘static quality of the analysis’ (Robison, 1989: 121) and 
pointing out that all developing countries, including Japan, ‘have begun from 
a position of technological backwardness’ (Booth, 1991: 162). With hindsight, 
however, it is clear that Yoshihara’s pessimistic vision was prescient.
At the beginning of the new century a survey of the automotive 
industry in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand confirmed that while the local 
content of motor vehicles produced in all three countries was increasing, 
‘crucial technologies and skills remain jealously guarded by foreign partners 
in the production of both vehicles and component parts’ (Abbott, 2003: 149).
‘The existence of such situations of dependence [...] raises questions 
about the long-term ability of the industry sectors [...] to mature and 
compete in more value-added production. Of particular concern [...] is 
that the failure to upgrade their skills-base and move into higher value-
added production is resulting in their low-wage competitive advantage 
being eroded by new competitors such as China.’ (Abbott, 2003: 151)
In Thailand, the region’s leading motor vehicle producer, the position of 
local suppliers in the industry actually weakened after 2000 as Toyota, Isuzu 
and the other Japanese companies which dominated the sector increasingly 
relied on Japanese parts manufacturers operating in Thailand, rather than 
on Thai partners. Taking continuing advantage of relatively low labor costs, 
assembly processes meanwhile remained labor-intensive, with output per 
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worker much lower than in richer countries (Busser, 2008). In Indonesia, 
attempts by local manufacturers to move up the ‘Global Value Chain’ (GVC) 
of the automobile industry likewise seem to have been impeded, rather than 
assisted, by accelerating foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector.
‘The Indonesian automotive industry is growing rapidly, but there 
are still several reasons for concern. First, domestic investment in the 
automotive and parts industries has been extremely low compared 
with the trend of FDI [...]. Within the automotive GVC [...] the 
upgrading opportunities of local parts-supplying firms - particularly 
those firms looking to climb the tiers of the subcontracting system [...] 
may be hindered by competition from incoming foreign firms [...]. This 
problem was confirmed by our interviews with executive officers of 
the local parts industry [...].’ (Natsuda, Otsuka & Thoburn, 2015: 62)
Dependence on foreign technology has constrained the development of 
indigenous motor vehicle design and manufacture even in Malaysia, where 
a sustained attempt has been made to develop a truly national automotive 
industry under the auspices of the government-linked Proton and Perodua 
companies. Despite its nationalist ambitions, Proton began in the 1980s as 
a joint venture with the Mitsubishi Motor Company (MMC) and its first 
production model was effectively a Mitsubishi Lancer, rebranded as the 
Proton Saga. The plan was to acquire, via the partnership with Mitsubishi, 
the skills and technologies Proton would need to design and manufacture 
exportable vehicles on an autonomous basis. This, however, proved easier 
said than done - at least partly because it was not in Mitsubishi’s interest to 
allow it to happen.
‘MMC was able to: sell the joint venture superannuated production 
equipment; slow down the pace of content localisation; keep prices 
of its own components far above world market prices; and build a car 
which Japanese managers knew would not meet safety standards for 
export to developed countries. When Mitsubishi was forced to localise 
components, it frequently did so through Japanese joint ventures which 
kept most technological learning out of Malaysian hands.’ (Studwell, 
2013: 120)
Studwell, the author of this account, contrasts Proton’s experience with that 
of South Korea’s Hyundai Motor Company (HMC), which chose to acquire 
new technology by hiring foreign experts on an individual and temporary 
basis rather than by entering into partnerships with foreign companies.
‘A [...] key to HMC’s manufacturing success was its ability to obtain 
foreign techology in such a way that the firm learned skills - and 
eventually learned how to originate its own technology - without 
becoming dependent on foreign multinationals. In the automotive 
industry, developing country car makers around the world have found 
it almost impossible to gain technological independence after getting 
into equity joint ventures with global auto firms. In joint ventures, it is 
too easy and too comfortable for the local entrant to become dependent 
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on drip-fed technology from a foreign partner, while multinationals 
have no interest in helping local firms export.’ (Studwell, 2013: 102)
Today Hyundai is the world’s third largest motor vehicle manufacturer, 
with sales in almost every country. Proton does not make the top forty, and 
has almost no export sales. In June 2017 its parent company, DRB-Hicom, 
sold a 49.9 per cent stake in Proton to a Chinese concern, Geely. Thailand, 
meanwhile, exports two million vehicles each year under many international 
brand names, but still has no producer of its own, remaining essentially a low-
cost offshore assembly platform for overseas manufacturers. Indonesia too 
has followed a dependent path, and exports a growing but still much smaller 
number of locally assembled Japanese and Korean models.
We may of course question the extent to which the relational problems 
outlined above - rather than, for instance, inferior education and training, 
or lack of managerial ambition - are responsible for the absence of globally 
successful Southeast Asian car producers. How much this absence ultimately 
has to do with the persistent economic gap between Southeast and Northeast 
Asia is even more debatable. What is nevertheless clear is that ‘dependent 
development’ is not just an outdated neo-Marxist theory of Latin American 
underdevelopment, but a real, tangible problem for specific enterprises even 
in dynamic East Asia - or rather, in those parts of East Asia which have 
been described as caught in a ‘middle-income trap’. Moreover the pattern of 
persistent technological dependency on Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 
as a World Bank report from 2009 emphasizes, is not limited to the motor 
vehicle industry.
‘Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand [...] have all acquired considerable 
manufacturing capabilities, most notably in electronic and electrical 
engineering, textiles, and the automotive industry. [...] However, 
innovation - product or process - remains mainly a preserve of the 
MNCs; indigenous firms do very little innovation. More disquieting is 
the sparseness of backward links from MNC operations, which would 
signify progressive industrial deepening [..]. This lack of backward 
links means that domestic value added in manufacturing remains low.’ 
(Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2009: 9-10)
Malaysia’s foreign-owned high-technology industries are evocatively 
characterized by Wade as ‘cathedrals in the desert’, transplanted marvels 
lacking any substantial integration into the surrounding domestic economy 
(Wade, 2016: 472).
In studies of the Southeast Asian auto industry, even authors not 
directly engaged in Northeast Asian comparisons conclude that strong 
state intervention is necessary to enable domestic manufacturers to move 
up the value chain and avoid either permanent defeat by, or permanent 
subordination to, more experienced, technologically advanced, and capital-
rich foreign competitors (Busser, 2008: 42; Natsuda & Thoburn, 2013: 434). 
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The historically indicated best practice would appear to be that of South 
Korea, where foreign competition was largely excluded from the domestic 
market, but local entrepreneurs at the same time assisted by the state to enter 
the industry, and forced by politically imposed export requirements to acquire 
the technologies and skills they needed for international competitiveness and 
expansion. Why have Southeast Asian states not followed this path, rather 
than settling for industrial dependency?
Historical Origins of Independent Industrial Development: 
Regime Vulnerability
Perhaps the most coherent explanation found in the academic literature for 
the Northeast/Southeast Asian industrial development divergence is based 
on the idea that it was the ‘systemic vulnerability’ of postwar political regimes 
in South Korea and Taiwan that effectively forced them to take the difficult 
steps needed to follow the independent rather than the dependent path 
(Doner, 2009; Doner, Ritchie and Slater, 2005). Faced with real threats both 
of internal revolution and of foreign invasion, and lacking any abundant 
natural resources to provide a ready-made economic basis for strong state 
power and national defense, their governments concluded that they had no 
alternative to rapid industrialization if they and the states they controlled 
were to survive. Under these circumstances, the creation of an autonomous 
and internationally competitive industrial sector became an urgent national 
project. ‘When a nation’s survival is at stake’, wrote South Korean president 
Park Chung Hee, ‘politics, economy, culture, everything should be organized 
and mobilized for that single purpose’ (Park, 1979: 130). Japan, in a longer 
historical frame, can be included in the same model, faced as it was first with 
the threat of colonial conquest, then with the challenge of proving itself as 
an imperialist latecomer in a Eurocentric world, and finally with the task 
of recovering, under the shadow both of its communist enemies and of its 
new American protectors, from the disastrous defeat of 1945. The key to 
East Asian industrialization, in this perspective, was ‘the East Asian setting 
of revolutionary nationalism - not a garden variety nationalism but one that 
grew from war and imperialism’ (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 7).
Nationalism and revolution played important roles in Southeast 
Asian economic history too, in particular when the threat of revolutionary 
communism inspired national leaders to respond to rural discontent by 
implementing pro-poor, pro-rural development strategies (Henley, 2015). 
But while an internal revolutionary threat was often present, a sustained 
military threat from outside the state usually was not. Unlike their northern 
neighbors, some Southeast Asian countries had the further comfort of 
being relatively rich in natural resources, which gave their rulers easier 
ways of funding their own and their citizens’ welfare than trying to create 
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autonomous industrial strength. These circumstances arguably held Southeast 
Asian governments back from advancing beyond agricultural growth and 
labor-intensive, dependent industrialization into the more difficult arena of 
state-led industrial development.
In any developing country domestic capital, left to its own devices, tends 
to be too myopic and risk-averse to make long-term industrial investments on 
the necessary scale; it can only be induced to do so by means of protection and 
subsidy (Studwell, 2007; 2013). Once these supports are in place, however, 
only very strong collective political will can prevent such a cosy, mutually 
beneficial relationship from developing between politicians and industrialists 
that it becomes impossible to expose maturing industries to the vital test of 
international competition.
‘[T]he case of the Korean chaebol - or the Japanese zaibatsu - is not 
like what one finds in the Southeast Asian countries: it is not a case of 
indiscriminate ‘crony capitalism’. What one had in Southeast Asia was 
not a nationalistic mobilization for export led growth, as in Japan and 
Korea, but a kind of “protection ring”. Indonesia was the worst case 
[...].’ (Woo-Cummings, 1999: 19)
It is the difficulty of transcending this ‘crony capitalism’ under all but 
the most severe conditions of external threat which, according to the 
‘systemic vulnerability’ model, explains Southeast Asia’s ‘tendency to cede 
manufacturing issues to foreign producers’ (Doner, 2009: 260).
This type of explanation for Southeast Asian industrial retardation is 
not without weaknesses. Thailand, for instance, was not only subject - just 
like Japan - to a threat of European conquest in the colonial period, but also 
to a renewed possibility of invasion (as well as domestic insurrection) during 
the second half of the twentieth century, when it was a front-line state in the 
Cold War and ‘most political leaders in Thailand [...] perceived a military 
threat from communist Vietnam’ (Warr, 1993: 19). Whether Thailand 
can usefully be classed as a ‘resource-rich’ country is also doubtful, since it 
lacks the major oil and gas deposits that are generally thought of as the most 
important reason to classify Indonesia and Malaysia as such. The claim that 
Southeast Asian governments have lacked serious commitment to state-led 
industrialization is questionable too, particularly in the case of Malaysia where 
long-serving prime minister Mahathir Mohamad was personally responsible 
for founding the company charged with the National Car Project, Proton, 
which he alternately led or advised for more than three decades from 1983 to 
2016. Mahathir’s failure to make Proton sufficiently independent of foreign 
partners, and to subject it to adequate ‘export discipline’, seems to have been 
caused as much by his misunderstanding of the Japanese success stories that 
inspired it as by any personal interests which he or his political allies had in 




Nevertheless, it is not my intention to contest the usefulness of the 
vulnerability model, which clearly does identify important forces behind 
the observed divergence between Southeast and Northeast Asian industrial 
development strategies. Rather, the following part of the present article 
aims to complement that model’s focus on twentieth-century high politics 
by highlighting another circumstance, more deeply rooted in history, which 
also helps to explain the divergence.
Historical Origins of Dependent Industrial Development: 
Ethnic Capitalism
Korea and Taiwan, like Japan, emerged from the colonial era as relatively 
homogenous societies to which whatever capitalist elements were present 
ultimately belonged, just like the rest of the population. In colonial Southeast 
Asia, by contrast, business and commerce were largely the preserve of alien 
minorities. These included not only Europeans, who - like the Japanese in 
Korea and Taiwan - mostly departed following decolonization, but also 
millions of Chinese and South Asians who had been encouraged to migrate 
to the region by colonial governments, and whose descendants remained 
there in the postcolonial period as ethnically distinct communities of ‘pariah 
entrepreneurs’ (Riggs, 1966: 249-254). The full reasons for this contrast are 
a matter of controversy, and more will be said about them in the conclusion. 
But whatever the historical processes involved, the undisputed outcome is 
that ‘the dominant commercial role of the ethnic Chinese immigrant minority 
in Southeast Asia has no parallel in Northeast Asia’ (Lim 1996: 94).
The Southeast Asian pattern of ethnic business specialization seems 
to have had profound consequences for the political economy of the region’s 
postcolonial states. Ample evidence, as noted, suggests that the goal of non-
dependent industrial development is most effectively pursued as an urgent 
national project in which all elements of society take part and in which the 
role of big business, albeit acting under strong state discipline, is particularly 
crucial.
‘The developmental state in East Asia has always been a paradise for 
big business, and unlike the northern European ‘welfare states’, the 
protective gaze in Northeast Asia has never been down, toward the 
downtrodden, but rather upward, toward the privileged, to help big 
business compete more vigorously in the global marketplace - with 
its legitimacy resting in the eternal invocation of nationalism.’ (Woo-
Cummings, 1999: 30)
In reality the Northeast Asian states, particularly during the initial 
agricultural phase of their development, were perhaps not as indifferent to 
the ‘downtrodden’ as this account suggests. Nevertheless it is true that in 
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the industrial phase, rich capitalists were the most direct beneficiaries of a 
development strategy which still had to be cast and understood as a national 
endeavor serving the common interest. In countries where the capitalists 
mostly belong to an envied and unpopular ethnic minority, to the point that 
their very membership in the national community was in doubt, such an 
endeavor was bound to be problematic.
The developmental consequences of this dilemma are clearest in the 
case of Malaysia, where national politics have always revolved around the 
relationship between the indigenous (bumiputera) Malay majority, which is 
politically dominant, and the ethnic Chinese and Indian minorities, which 
dominate the private sector. No development policy, consequently, can be 
blind to the need to redress economic disparities between Malays and non-
Malays. Malaysia’s enduring historical stance of ‘exceptional openness toward 
the international economy’ (Drabble, 2000: 262), including foreign direct 
investment, may itself have been inspired in the postcolonial period by a tacit 
preference among Malays for any kind of development that does not further 
enrich - and potentially empower - Chinese Malaysians, even if it enriches 
foreigners instead (Jesudason, 1989: 167-168). What is certain is that the 
political impossibility of embracing experienced non-Malay entrepreneurs 
as partners in Mahathir’s national industrialization drive (Bowie, 1991: 132-
135) was a serious practical problem for state-backed industrial projects like 
Proton.
‘Mahathir mixed up industrial policy with affirmative action. He came 
to power promising to raise up the indigenous bumiputera population. 
In so doing, he painted himself into a racial corner where he decided he 
could not use Malaysia’s mostly ethnic Chinese and Tamil established 
entrepreneurs to run his new heavy industrial investments. Instead, 
he tried to implement effective industrial policy and create a new 
generation of Malay entrepreneurs at the same time. This was always 
going to be difficult.’ (Studwell, 2013: 107-108)
The predictable failure of Proton vehicles to achieve export competitiveness 
in the 1980s pushed Malaysia inexorably back toward the strategy, by then 
already tried and tested, of relying on foreign direct investment, particularly 
in the electronics sector, as the main driver of its export industries (Bowie, 
1991: 142-152).
In Indonesia, comparably, state-sponsored industrial endeavors 
- notably in aviation - labored under the disadvantage of having to work 
through inefficient state-owned enterprises and with inexperienced 
managers, rather than trying to build on existing commercial institutions 
and managerial expertise in the private sector (Goldstein, 2002; McKendrick, 
1992). In relation to the Philippines, Yoshihara has argued more broadly that 
a key reason for the lackluster development performance of that country, 
particularly in the first decades of its independence, has been systematic 
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official discrimination against its ethnic Chinese population, most of whom, 
until as late as 1975, did not have Filipino citizenship (Yoshihara, 1994: 235). 
Alasdair Bowie generalized further by arguing (by way of extrapolation from 
Malaysian evidence) that wherever ‘society is communal and [...] there are 
disparities in economic and political power between communities’, tensions 
among those communities ‘are likely to constrain the state’s ability to pursue 
industrial strategies of the kind employed by the capitalist developmental 
states of East Asia’ (Bowie, 1991: 159).
The idea that ethnic capitalism as such - or more exactly, the political 
reaction against it - has been a central obstacle to development in Southeast 
Asia is not universally popular. Among its critics is Malaysian political 
economist K.S. Jomo, who stresses (citing in particular the Christian minority 
in Korea) that the Northeast Asian countries are themselves ‘hardly culturally 
homogeneous’ and suggests that the real key to the Northeast/Southeast Asia 
divergence lies in the contrasting ways in which their entrepreneurial groups, 
regardless of ethnicity, were treated in colonial times by their Japanese and 
European rulers respectively (Jomo, 2003: 18).
‘A crucial question is whether or not there is or has been a capable and 
strong enough national bourgeoisies in the Southeast Asian context - 
even if only mainly from among the ranks of the Chinese businessmen 
- to have been able to effectively advance late industrialization. There 
are several reasons why the existence of such potential is doubted, 
beginning with the consequences of European colonialism. Unlike 
Japanese colonialism in South Korea and Taiwan, European colonial 
policies in Southeast Asia are believed to have strengthened the 
development of comprador or dependent elements of the primarily 
ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie. Hence, such interests have been integrated 
earlier on [...] with foreign capital, at the expense of other business 
interests who might have been more inclined to undertake or support 
nationalist economic projects.’ (Jomo, 2003: 19.)
Is such scepticism about the industrial potential of postcolonial Southeast 
Asian capitalism justified? There is little doubt that Japanese colonial policy, 
especially in Korea, was in various ways more favorable to the industrial sector 
than were the policies of the European colonial powers in Southeast Asia, and 
that considerable industrialization did take place in prewar Korea (Haggard, 
Kang  & Moon, 1997: 868-869). But whether the entrepreneurs who actually 
spearheaded South Korea’s postwar industrialization owed anything to this 
earlier history, or differed markedly in their origins or capabilities from the 
‘comprador’ capitalists of Southeast Asia, is much less clear. Studwell, in a 
fascinating series of biographical cameos, points to striking parallels between 
the early careers of prominent Malaysian ‘godfathers’ and that of Hyundai 
founder Chung Ju-Yung (1915-2001), whose first business activities were 
in rice trading and car repair, followed by construction contracts for the US 
military during the American occupation (1945-1948).
41Foreign Investment and the Middle Income Trap in Southeast Asia
Vol. 14 No. 1 April 2018
‘Chung’s family business structure, the nature of his business activities 
and his foibles were the same as those of the oligarchs who have 
dominated Southeast Asian economies. In the 1950s in particular 
he operated in a cronyistic environment in which kickbacks and bid 
rigging [...] were endemic. By the time of Park Chung Hee’s coup, 
Hyundai Construction was one of the Big Five Korean building firms. 
Chung had never made or exported anything. He was just a politically 
astute entrepreneur with a reputation for getting construction jobs 
done. In post-independence South-East Asia, he would have carried 
on doing construction work and added more domestic business 
concessions to his portfolio as the state offered them up.’ (Studwell, 
2013: 90.)
What changed, according to Studwell, was simply that the government of 
South Korea, unlike those of Southeast Asian countries, decided to induce, 
indeed force, its ‘cronies’ to embark on the difficult and risky path of learning 
and investment which eventually made Hyundai a global manufacturing 
giant. This view is supported by the insider testimony of a former manager 
of the (Sino-)Indonesian automotive company Astra, a Toyota import and 
assembly partner, speaking in 2007 about the differences between his own 
firm’s development and that of Hyundai:
‘A top Astra official recounted a meeting in South Korea at which the 
head of Hyundai Motors emphasized that his company was given no 
choice but to develop the internal capacities necessary for exporting 
automotive products with high levels of local value added. By contrast 
[...] Indonesia’s clientelist politics, its large domestic market, and its 
extensive protection [...] allowed Astra lots of “freedom” to avoid 
exports while depriving the firm of the support required to improve 
its internal technological capacities.’ (Doner, 2009: 274.)
The difference, in other words, lay in the policies of the respective states, 
and not in the ‘strength’ or ‘capability’ of the enterprises or entrepreneurial 
classes concerned. And in Indonesia and (especially) Malaysia, as we have 
seen, an important influence on industrial policy was the prevailing system 
of ethnic business specialization, which made it difficult for politicians to 
engage established capitalists as partners in national development, rather than 
as partners in corrupt clientelistic exchanges of licenses for bribes.
In Malaysia and Indonesia the developmental problem sketched 
above is particularly persistent and intractable given that Islam, since the 
1970s a growing influence in society and politics, divides the majority of 
the indigenous population from the ethnic Chinese. In the case of Buddhist 
Thailand, where the ethnic boundary is more porous and more people of 
Chinese descent have assimilated to the majority group, the situation is 
more complex. Here the moderating effect of cultural affinities was further 
enhanced from the 1930s to the 1970s by state policies of compulsory cultural 
assimilation for Sino-Thais, and by growing acceptance among indigenous 
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Thais of the moral legitimacy of business as a profession. Yoshihara already 
regarded the ‘Chinese question’ as ‘a dead issue’ for Thailand in the 1980s 
(Yoshihara, 1988: 128). Certainly it does not seem to have played a significant 
role in the country’s recent political turbulence, even though the populist 
leader who changed the face of Thai politics with his election as prime minister 
in 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, is himself a Sino-Thai businessman. It follows 
that the phenomenon of ethnic business specialization provides no direct 
explanation for the continuing absence in today’s Thailand of a concerted 
national industrialization drive based on the incubation of indigenous design 
and export capacity.
Indirectly, nevertheless, the dependent pattern of industrial 
development that is so clearly evident in contemporary Thailand may 
still reflect a history of ethnic division. Although Thailand’s capitalist 
class is no longer seen today as an alien Chinese intrusion into a society 
of Thai peasants, aristocrats, and clerks, until the middle of the twentieth 
century this was emphatically how Thais viewed it, even in official circles 
(Landon, 1940). It was not until 1957 that attempts to promote government 
corporations to counter Chinese economic power were abandoned, and 
residual discrimination in the economic sphere continued until the 1970s 
(Yoshihara, 1994: 35-36). It is important to remember that because of the self-
perpetuating aspect of dependent industrial development as illustrated above, 
the forces pushing a nation down the dependent path do not necessarily 
need to be sustained for long in order to make that path inescapable. Once 
local industries are outcompeted in the domestic market by foreign rivals, or 
inserted into international production chains under the auspices of foreign 
partners, a window of opportunity for autonomous development may be 
more or less permanently closed. To what extent this is what happened in 
post-war Thailand is a question deserving of further research.
Conclusion
Using selective comparisons with Northeast Asia, particularly Korea, this 
essay has sketched the outlines of two linked arguments regarding the 
long-term economic development trajectory of Southeast Asia. First: the 
persistent inability of Southeast Asian countries to transcend middle income 
status results partly from their dependence on, and domination by, foreign 
investment and foreign technology in the industrial export sector. Second: the 
policy decisions which resulted in this dependency - or perhaps better, which 
failed to avert it - were related to two major ways in which the historical 
circumstances of Southeast Asia differed from that of Northeast Asia: the fact 
that its governments were not under existential political and military pressure 
to bring about industrial transformation, and the fact that its economies were 
dominated by alien business minorities.
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It should go without saying that by endorsing the significance of ethnic 
capitalism in relation to the middle income trap, I do not mean to endorse 
the very practice of ‘blaming the Chinese’ for Southeast Asian problems 
which has been so damaging to Southeast Asian attempts to overcome those 
problems. My point, and that of many other commentators, is simply that the 
historical concentration of business wealth and expertise in the hands of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese has made it politically and psychologically difficult 
for Southeast Asian leaders to emulate their South Korean counterparts by 
embracing their domestic capitalists, even with the kind of ‘tough love’ which 
Park Chung Hee showed for Chung Ju-Yung and his peers, as partners in 
national development.
The on-going abatement of tensions between indigenous and ethnic 
Chinese groups in some Southeast Asian countries, particularly Thailand and 
the Philippines, must bode well for a solution to these problems. However, 
it is not my purpose here to make predictions on the basis of the arguments 
presented. Given the theme of the current special issue, it is more appropriate 
to conclude by reflecting on the relevance of my narrative to the study of 
economic history of Indonesia during the colonial era.
That narrative, of course, has not been directly concerned with 
colonialism, and unlike some writers on Northeast and Southeast Asian 
development performance (Booth, 2007; Kohli, 1994) I have not tried to 
trace the lineages of key postcolonial policies back to colonial precursors and 
preconditions. In relation to South Korea I have argued specifically against 
the idea that post-war industrial success built on entrepreneurial foundations 
that were decisively stronger than those present in Southeast Asia at the time 
of decolonization. The military and revolutionary threats that galvanized 
industrial policy in Korea and Taiwan certainly had little to do with colonial 
legacies.
When it comes to ethnic capitalism and its consequences, on the other 
hand, colonialism is clearly implicated in the story. The predominance of 
ethnic Chinese business in Southeast Asia, after all, was established during 
the colonial era, and partly as a result of colonial policies. At the genesis of 
European colonialism in Indonesia during the seventeenth century, the Dutch 
East India Company fought to monopolize the archipelago’s international 
commerce at the expense of independent trading cities like Makassar and 
Banten, while populating its own strongholds at Jakarta and elsewhere with 
Chinese immigrant laborers and shopkeepers (Reid, 1993: 267-325). Later 
colonial states, particularly in British Malaya, consolidated the pattern by 
promoting both Chinese immigration and ethnic segregation. It was partly due 
to such colonial policies that almost every Southeast Asian nation effectively 
entered the modern world as what Reid, writing of Indonesia, called ‘a people 
without a bourgeoisie’ (Reid, 1974: 6). Much more could of course be said 
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about the political and ideological consequences of this circumstance, which 
often pushed Southeast Asian nationalists in the direction of comprehensively 
anti-capitalist ideas as well as making it difficult for them to engage with 
ethnic Chinese capitalism in particular.
When assessing the role of European rule in this story, however, it is 
important to note that the presence of foreign trading minorities in Southeast 
Asia antedated colonialism, and to remember that the characteristic modern 
pattern of ethnic Chinese commercial dominance developed in independent 
Thailand as well as in the European colonies. Aspects of the region’s pre-
colonial political economy already seem to have been conducive to it (Reid, 
1993: 124-129). There is in fact good reason to think of this as the global 
norm. Historically speaking, trade-specialized ethnic minorities have been 
common features of underdeveloped and developing economies across most 
of the world - including, until quite recently, Europe, with its prominent, and 
despised, Jewish commercial diasporas (Hamilton, 1978).
Rather than looking for ways to interpret Southeast Asia’s middle 
income trap as a legacy of colonialism, it may be more productive in this 
context to ask whether the processes giving rise to the trap had parallels 
during the colonial period which can shed light on the economic history of 
that time. Decidedly thought-provoking here is the ease with which foreign 
capital, in postcolonial Southeast Asia, has apparently been able to dominate 
key industrial sectors and subordinate domestic capitalists to its own projects 
and interests, to the extent of preventing them from developing skills and 
capacities which might enable them to compete with their overseas ‘partners’. 
In colonial times, of course, there were as yet no internationally integrated 
industrial production chains. But if dependency has been a tangible problem 
for sovereign nations in the postcolonial period, how much more of a problem 
is it likely to have been for a colonized people, ruled by a state acting in even 
greater concert with foreign investors, and in an era when the superiority of 
foreign over indigenous capital, business methods, and technology was even 
greater than today?
The usefulness of the Korean counterfactual when it comes to 
understanding postcolonial Southeast Asia is a reminder that when studying 
the impact of foreign investment in colonial Indonesia, it cannot be enough 
simply to note how many jobs, ‘linkages’ and ‘spillovers’ were created, or 
what skills were apparently transferred. We must also try to consider to what 
extent indigenous competitors, both actual and potential, were crowded out 
by the presence of foreign capital, and with what long-term consequences. 
The question is never just what happened because foreign enterprise and the 
institutions supporting it were there, but also what might have happened had 
they not been there.
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